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6 Synonyms
7 Association psychology; Association theory
8 Definition
9 “Associationism” can refer to a well-defined historical
10 tradition or, more controversially, to a range of
11 approaches influenced by the former. The historical tradi-
12 tion, developed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth
13 century mainly by British philosophers, appealed to the
14 association of mental contents with one another to explain
15 the nature of human thought and knowledge. Current
16 forms of associationism assume that complex psycholog-
17 ical units are built from simpler elements on the basis of
18 experience and through a process (“association”) that is
19 both general across domains and structure-independent.
20 This process is typically sensitive to coincidences, correla-
21 tions, or statistical dependencies among events, and the
22 psychological units formed on its basis come to reflect
23 such dependencies.
24 Theoretical Background
25 The philosophical tradition of associationism can be
26 traced back to Aristotle, but it developed mainly from
27 the seventeenth to the nineteenth century through the
28 effort of scholars, most of them English, interested in the
29 origins and nature of human knowledge (Warren 1921).
30 Important exponents of associationism include, in histor-
31 ical order, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), David Hartley
32 (1705–1757), E´tienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780),
33 James Mill (1773–1836), Thomas Brown (1778–1820),
34 John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), Alexander Bain (1818–
35 1903), and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Associationism
36 also can be found in the philosophical works of John
37 Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and
38 David Hume (1711–1776), reflecting its dual importance
39for psychology and epistemology. The associationist phi-
40losophers relied on the introspective method and the
41phenomenological investigation of thought sequences to
42uncover the psychological principles that might underlie
43the latter. Most of these philosophers also speculated on
44the nature of the physiological machinery that made asso-
45ciation possible. All invoked associative principles (not
46necessarily under that name) through which complex
47mental contents could be produced out of simpler ones.
48Beyond this shared commitment, associationist phi-
49losophers differed among themselves in ways that antici-
50pate current debates in behavioral and cognitive sciences.
51Important differences concerned the scope of the associa-
52tive process. Did it apply to rational thought, for example,
53or only to haphazard mental sequences forged out of
54coincidences? Did the associative process account for all
55of psychological structure, or should it be supplemented
56by faculties responsible for the organization of mental
57contents? Other differences concerned the nature of the
58elements being associated. Could they include sensory
59presentations, feelings, or motor elements, as well as men-
60tal contents? Could volition and motor control be built on
61associative principles? The modes of association, simulta-
62neous versus successive, were also the subject of contro-
63versy. Some associationists admitted simultaneous
64association as a genuine process so as to account for
65perceptual organization (with different visual compo-
66nents, for example, combined into a single scene), but
67others emphasized the successive associations necessary
68to produce trains of thought. The principles of similarity
69and contrast were debated, with some associationists
70attempting to reduce contrast to a combination of identi-
71cal elements paired with different associates. Another
72important debate opposed “mechanical” to “chemical”
73conceptions of association (Warren 1921). Did the com-
74ponents of a complex thought preserve their identity
75through the association process, or did they merge so as
76to produce a mental configuration irreducible to its
77antecedents?
78Associationism strongly influenced experimental psy-
79chology at the end of the nineteenth century and the
80beginning of the twentieth century. Research aimed at
81associationist principles involved the investigation of
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82 memory and the effect of practice on behavior, the
83 measure of reaction times in the production of verbal
84 associates, and the use of verbal association in the study
85 of individual differences, development, intelligence, and
86 psychopathology. Warren (1921) also mentions the “con-
87 ditioned reflex” as a case of “motor association” and
88 suggests that “the conditioned reflex belongs to the pre-
89 sent and future of association psychology” (p. 257).
90 Applying the label of “associationism” to any theory
91 formulated after the early twentieth century, however,
92 faces a serious conceptual problem. In the twentieth
93 century, the emergence of behaviorism shifted the meth-
94 odological ground of psychology from introspection to
95 behavioral evidence (Brunswik 1952), and the informa-
96 tion-processing theories formulated after the establish-
97 ment of behaviorism often appealed to representational
98 constructs that may not be accessible to consciousness.
99 Thus, contemporary psychological theories typically do
100 not involve the association of conscious contents with
101 one another. The associationist label can retain its useful-
102 ness only if a definition of “associationism” can be pro-
103 vided that is broad enough to cover widely different
104 perspectives but not so broad as to exclude nothing.
105 Anderson and Bower (1973) have risen to the chal-
106 lenge and proposed a definition of “associationism” in
107 terms of four basic assumptions (p. 10):
108 ● Psychological units are connected by experience.
109 ● Complex units can be reduced to a limited stock of
110 primitive units.
111 ● These primitive units consist of sensations.
112 ● Units combine through simple additive rules.
113 Although this characterization of associationism as rely-
114 ing on elementary sensations may be adequate to mentalis-
115 tic psychology, it fails to capture the associationism (if any)
116 of behavioral psychology, the basic units of which are cer-
117 tainly not sensory experiences. Following on Anderson and
118 Bower’s proposal, therefore, Fodor (1983) has defended
119 a broad definition of “associationism” that is better
120 designed to cover “the classical mentalist or themore recent
121 learning-theoretic variety” (p. 27) of associationist psychol-
122 ogy. According to Fodor, associationism entails:
123 ● A set of basic elements out of which more complex
124 structures are built
125 ● A relation of association defined over these elements
126 and structures
127 ● Principles of association whereby experience deter-
128 mines which structures are built
129 ● Theoretical parameters of the associative relation and
130 its terms
131Fodor explicitly admits behavioral as well as mental
132elements in his definition of “associationism,” so the latter
133does cover the full range of approaches that may be rea-
134sonably called associationist. His definition accommo-
135dates the philosophical tradition of associationism (in
136which mental contents are associated with one another)
137as well as current connectionist models of cognition (in
138which the links between nodes are strengthened on the
139basis of experience) and behavioral forms of association-
140ism in which the conditional probabilities between stimuli
141and operant actions change through reinforcement.
142At the same time, Fodor’s (1983) definition is not so
143general as to be vacuous. An important point, left implicit
144in the 1983 definition but later emphasized by Fodor and
145Pylyshyn (1988), is that not any relation or structure-
146building process among psychological components qual-
147ifies as association. To qualify as the latter, the process that
148builds more complex units out of simpler ones must
149proceed on the basis of experience (expressed as contigu-
150ity, correlation, or statistical dependency) and regardless of
151the structure of the components being related. The issue with
152associationism, therefore, is not whether psychological
153states are structured. All parties in the debate agree on
154this score. The issue is rather whether the processes that
155build complex psychological states are structure-sensitive
156or not. The claim that they are not is characteristic of
157associationism.
158In current behavioral theories, for example, reinforce-
159ment depends on the temporal correlation between
160responding and its consequences and operates regardless
161of the organization of the action being reinforced.
162Whether the latter consists of a simple response or
163a complex hierarchy of interlocked actions is irrelevant
164to the reinforcement process (although the speed with
165which conditioning takes place may depend on the dura-
166tion of the reinforced unit and other temporal parame-
167ters). Similarly, the strength of the links in a connectionist
168network is modified by statistical and temporal relations
169among activation values regardless of the internal struc-
170ture (if any) of the connected nodes and of what they are
171supposed to represent. And in the philosophical tradition
172of associationism, mental contents are associated by expe-
173rience regardless of their intrinsic organization.
174By contrast, in the theory of mind as a physical symbol
175system, the computational (not associative) operations
176that produce new states out of previous ones are sensitive
177to the structure of these states (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988).
178Thus, when a desktop computer prints “17” in response to
179“13 + 4” and “35” in response to “31 + 4,” what is printed
180does not depend on a history of association between
181inputs and output – a history which, under different
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182 circumstances, might just as well have linked “31 + 4” to
183 “17” and “13 + 4” to “35.” Rather, the printed output
184 depends on a sequence of built-in operations such that
185 structural differences in the input (“13 + 4” versus
186 “31 + 4”) lead to structural differences in the output
187 (“17” versus “35”) through different intermediate steps.
188 Such structure-dependent operations are characteristic of
189 the computational theory of mind and other approaches
190 to cognition that oppose associationism (Fodor 1983).
191 Associationism and the computational theory of
192 mind, however, do not exhaust all theoretical possibilities.
193 The analysis of development in ecological psychology, for
194 example, qualifies neither as computational nor as associ-
195 ationist, since the principles it proposes operate neither
196 according to associative principles nor on the basis of
197 internal representations. Neither are associationism and
198 representational systems mutually exclusive, since repre-
199 sentational models may combine aspects that are
200 structure-independent (as when objects are linked to
201 a cognitive map regardless of their composition) with
202 others that are structure-sensitive (as when combining
203 two paths into a novel one). Furthermore, authors may
204 disagree onwhether amodel is or is not strictly associative,
205 depending on what they stipulate to be the defining fea-
206 tures of “associationism” (besides the broad notion of
207 a building process indifferent to the structures that it
208 relates). The label of “associationism,” although useful in
209 pinpointing shared issues, should not obscure the variety
210 and richness of the theoretical views to which it has been
211 applied.
212 Important Scientific Research and Open
213 Questions
214 Associationism in a broad sense assumes principles of
215 development or psychological change that are structure-
216 independent. A set of associative relations defined over
217 a collection of components, however, is itself a form of
218 organization. According to associationism, the latter orga-
219 nization has been derived from experience. The main
220 question with respect to associationism, therefore, is the
221 question of the origins of psychological structure; in par-
222 ticular, the extent to which psychological structure can be
223 attributed to regularities in experience, and the extent to
224 which other sources of organization must be postulated.
225 In the case of syntax acquisition, for example, the issue
226may concern howmuch of a child’s linguistic organization
227derives from statistical regularities in the child’s input.
228There is no guarantee that this sort of question has
229a unified answer across domains or even phenomena
230within the same psychological domain. Associationism
231may well fail in some cases while applying to others. The
232basic phenomena of Pavlovian conditioning, for instance,
233seem to call for explanations with associationist aspects.
234(The researchers who attribute conditional responding to
235the formation of cognitive maps may want to deny this,
236but their denial would simply reflect a narrower definition
237of “associationism” than the one adopted here.) As formal
238models developed in the field of conditioning are extended
239to cover features of human perception, memory, and
240language, the limits of associationist explanations in psy-
241chology should become clearer.
242In many cases, a successful associationist account of
243the data may require relations among elements, as well as
244the elements themselves, to be subject to association. If the
245structure-building operation proceeds regardless of the
246nature of the relations involved, then the resulting models
247will remain within the province of associationism as we
248defined it (although they may fail to qualify on a narrower
249definition). The most difficult cases for any associationist
250account involve cognitive phenomena in which structure
251is paramount: in particular, inference and reasoning
252through language-like processes. Whether such phenom-
253ena can be accommodated within a broadly associationist
254framework may depend on the development of more
255powerful theoretical formalisms.
256Cross-References
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